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PRECAP; Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality: Does Identity Matter? Evaluating the Parameters of the 





I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
(1) Did the District Court err when it determined that the Montana 
Department of Environmental Quality (hereinafter “DEQ”) violated the 
Montana Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter “MEPA”) when it failed 
to consider the impact of the construction and operation of a proposed 
grocery-retail facility as a “secondary impact” to the issuance of a 
groundwater discharge permit?1 
(2) Did the District Court err when it created a “test” for disclosing 
the identity of the future operator of the permit as a “requirement” of the 




On appeal, Appellants argue that when the DEQ issues a 
groundwater discharge permit it does not need to consider the identity of 
the future operator of the permit as a secondary impact, or as any part of 
its analysis, and that this consideration is beyond the scope of the DEQ’s 
authority.3 How the Court decides this case will determine whether the 
public has the right to know the true identity of the future operator of a 
groundwater discharge permit prior to its issuance by the DEQ and will 
clarify the breadth of the DEQ’s authority to investigate prior to its 
issuance of groundwater discharge permits. 
 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On April 3 2014, Montana real estate broker Lee Foss applied with 
the DEQ for a groundwater discharge permit for a proposed large-scale 
grocery-retail facility that was to be built on a parcel of land located near 
 
 
1 Opening Brief of Appellant DEQ at 1, Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality,  https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-0429%20Appellant's%20Opening%20- 
-%20Brief?id={60DF0758-0000-C422-B131-A8A46E8893CD}, (Mont. October 26, 2016) (No. DA. 
16-0429). 
2 Opening Brief of Appellant Wanderer at 1, Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-0429%20Appellant's%20Opening%20- 
-%20Brief?id={90FA0758-0000-CE17-B661-41918784F663}, (Mont. October 26, 2016) (No. DA. 
16-0429). 
3 Opening Brief of Appellant DEQ, supra note 1, at 8; Opening Brief of Appellant Wanderer, supra 
note 2, at 8. 




Hamilton, Montana.4 On April 21, 2014, the DEQ returned the application 
to Foss, noting that there were several deficiencies in the permit.5 The DEQ 
specifically requested confirmation that the correct name of the facility 
was “Parcel # 698800” and that Foss would be the responsible entity who 
would be authorized to discharge state water.6 The DEQ sought this 
information because the application was “unique,” in that the facility name 
was not something more descriptive, such as “Albertsons” or “Ace 
Hardware.”7 On April 29, 2014, a private consulting firm answered on 
Foss’s behalf and confirmed that Foss would be the holder of the permit 
and that the name of the parcel was “Parcel # 698800.”8 However, Foss 
acknowledged that he would not be the actual operator of what was to 
eventually become a large-scale grocery-retail facility.9 
In May 2014, the DEQ created a draft of the Environmental 
Assessment (hereinafter “EA”) for the proposed permit.10 In its draft EA, 
the DEQ concluded that “the project lack[ed] significant adverse effects to 
the human and physical environment.”11 In reaching its conclusion, the 
DEQ analyzed certain secondary issues that would be impacted by the 
permit, such as the potential increase of traffic into the area that the store 
could generate.12 
The DEQ held a public hearing to accept comments from the 
public on September 18, 2014.13 The DEQ continued to accept public 
comments on the permit application process through October 15, 2014.14 
At these meetings, certain members of the public expressed concern over 
numerous issues, including the fact that the identity of the party that would 
ultimately operate the permit was not revealed in the permit application.15 
Despite these concerns, the identity of the future operator of the grocery- 
retail facility was never revealed during the permitting process and on 
November 17, 2014, the DEQ issued the permit in Lee Foss’s name.16 
When the DEQ issued the permit, it removed from its draft EA any 




4 Answer Brief of Appellees at 1, 4–5, Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-0429%20Appellee's%20Response%20-- 
%20Brief?id={A08EB259-0000-C817-A782-285D67733043}, (Mont. January 17, 2017) (No. DA. 
16-0429). 
5 Id. at 5. 
6 Id. 
7  Id. at 6. 
8  Id. at 6. 
9 Opening Brief of Appellant Wanderer, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
10 Answer Brief of Appellees, supra note 4, at 7. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Opening Brief of Appellant Wanderer, supra note 2, at 3. 
14 Id. 
15 Answer Brief of Appellees, supra note 4, at 8. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 




On January 26, 2015, Bitterrooters for Planning Inc. and Bitterroot 
River Protective Association, Inc. (hereinafter, collectively, 
“Bitterrooters”) filed a complaint and petition for judicial review against 
the DEQ in Lewis and Clark County District Court, challenging the DEQ’s 
issuance of the groundwater discharge permit to Foss.18 Bitterrooters’ 
complaint asserted that the DEQ had violated MEPA, the Montana Water 
Quality Act, and the Montana Constitution when it issued the permit to 
Foss.19 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
Bitterrooters on all of Bitterooters’ claims, except one: it dismissed 
Bitterooters’ claim that the DEQ had violated Bitterrooters’ constitutional 
public participation right, on the basis that the 30-day statute of limitations 
had expired.20 
On the other claims, the District Court held that the DEQ violated 
MEPA by failing to consider the secondary issues resulting from the 
construction and operation of the proposed grocery-retail facility as a 
secondary impact and by failing to consider the cumulative impacts of the 
groundwater discharge permit that had been issued to the Grantsdale 
subdivision located nearby.21 The District Court also held that the DEQ 
violated the Montana Water Quality Act by: 1) failing to consider the 
impacts that the permitted groundwater discharge would have on surface 
water, under Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.715(1)(d) (2015), and 2) failing to 
consider the cumulative impacts under Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.715(2) 
(2015) in reaching its determination that the permitted discharge would 
result in nonsignificant changes to existing water quality.22 Upon these 
findings, the District Court voided the DEQ’s issuance of the permit to 
Foss.23 
The DEQ has appealed the District Court’s decision only as it 
pertains to the District Court’s summary judgment ruling that requires it 
to consider the construction and operation of the retail facility as a 
secondary impact under MEPA.24 Appellants/Intervenors, Stephen 
Wanderer and Georgia Filcher, have joined this appeal, as they are the 
property owners attempting to sell their property through Mr. Foss and 
thus have a property interest in the outcome of this decision.25 Intervenors 
have joined in the DEQ’s appeal challenging the District Court’s analysis 




18 Opening Brief of Appellant DEQ, supra note 1, at 1. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 2. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Answer Brief of Appellees, supra note 4, at 3. 
24 Opening Brief of Appellant DEQ, supra note 1, at 2. 
25 Opening Brief of Appellant Wanderer, supra note 2, at 2. 
26 Id. at 16. 




created an unworkable test when it held that the DEQ must consider the 
identity of the future operator of the permit prior to its issuance.27 
 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellant Department of Environmental Quality 
 
1. The District Court erred when it determined that the consideration 
of the construction and operation of a grocery-retail facility is a secondary 
impact requiring analysis under MEPA. 
 
The DEQ argues on appeal that the District Court “misconstrued 
the definition of ‘secondary impact’ set forth in ARM 17.4.603(18).”28 The 
DEQ argues that direct impacts are “impacts arising from the authorized 
discharge to groundwater and impacts related to the construction of a 
subsurface wastewater treatment system.”29 Secondary impacts are those 
impacts that “are stimulated, induced or otherwise result from a direct 
impact of the action.”30 In order to qualify as a secondary impact, there 
must be a direct causal link between the direct impacts of the DEQ’s 
actions and the secondary impacts on the environment.31 The DEQ argues 
that the construction and operation of a grocery-retail facility does not 
meet the definition of secondary impacts and is thus beyond the scope of 
the DEQ’s required analysis.32 
The DEQ further asserts that the District Court erred in concluding 
that “the main purpose of issuing the permit is to authorize the construction 
of the proposed retail facility.”33 The DEQ argues that it has no legal 
authority to authorize the construction or operation of the grocery-retail 
facility.34 Rather, the DEQ is only required to analyze the direct and 
secondary impacts of the groundwater discharge permit itself, and the 
proper direct impacts are those outlined in the EA, such as the groundwater 
quality that will result from the issuance of the permit.35A proper 
secondary impact would be the impact this groundwater may potentially 
have on direct, causally-related issues such as surface water quality.36 
Thus, the construction of the grocery-retail facility does not stem from the 
direct impact of the groundwater quality and thus does not qualify as a 
secondary impact that needed analysis under MEPA.37 
 
27 Id. at 8. 
28 Opening Brief of Appellant DEQ, supra note 1, at 6. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 7. 
32 Id. 
33  Id. at 10. 








The DEQ cited to a number of “small handle” cases in support its 
position.38 These “small handle” cases generally stand for the proposition 
that when an agency such as the DEQ considers only a small part of a 
larger project, it lacks the authority to consider the potential environmental 
impacts of the larger project.39 The DEQ asserts that the construction of a 
grocery-retail facility falls under this category of “small handle” issues, 
over which the DEQ has no authority.40 The DEQ thus concludes that the 
construction and operation of the grocery-retail facility was not a 
secondary impact that required its analysis.41 
 
2. The DEQ does not have the authority to consider the identity of 
the Retailer and only needs to know the identity of the Permit Applicant, 
which it knows is Foss. 
 
The DEQ joins in Intervenors’ argument that the DEQ is not 
required to consider the identity of the future operator of the permit when 
it considers issuing a groundwater discharge permit.42 The DEQ asserts 
that the identity of the future operator of the permit has no real or potential 
impact on the environment and consideration of this is thus beyond the 
scope of its authority.43 The DEQ argues that, because it has the authority 
to ultimately enforce the permit,44 should the future operator violate the 
conditions of the permit, the future operator’s identity is irrelevant during 
the initial permitting process.45 Thus, the District Court should be reversed, 
and the DEQ should not be required to determine or consider the identity 








38 Id. at 12–17 (citing Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Bd. Of Health, 559 P.2d 1157 (Mont. 1976); 
Residents for Sane Trash Solutions v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 31 F. Supp. 3d 571 (S.D. N.Y. 
2014); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980); Save the Bay, Inc. v. U.S. 
Corps of Engineers, 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1980)); Reply Brief of Appellant DEQ at 15, 17, 18, 
Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-0429%20Appellant%20Reply%20-- 
%20Brief?id={10A8FB59-0000-C81E-866D-D56D72E19EA7}, (Mont. January 31, 2017) (No. DA. 
16-0429) (citing Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1989); Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (U.S. 2004); Save our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113 
(9th Cir. 2005)). 
39  Id. at 15. 
40  Id. at 17. 
41 Id. 
42 Reply Brief of Appellant DEQ, supra note 38, at 7–8. 
43 Id. at 8. 
44 See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75–5–601–641 (2015). 
45 Reply Brief of Appellant DEQ, supra note 38, at 8. 
46 Id. 




B. Appellant/Intervenors Stephen Wanderer and Georgia Filcher 
 
1. Intervenors join in the DEQ’s argument that the District Court 
erred when it determined that the consideration of the construction and 
operation of a grocery-retail facility 
is a secondary impact requiring analysis under MEPA. 
 
Intervenors add that requiring the DEQ to consider the impact of 
the grocery-retail facility as a secondary impact would impermissibly 
expand the scope of the DEQ into areas that are not of its concern, such as 
impacts on traffic, that are properly regulated by the Montana Department 
of Transportation.47 
 
2. The District Court erred in creating a “requirement” that the 
ultimate user of a groundwater discharge permit be revealed to the public 
at the time that the permit is issued. 
 
The thrust of Intervenors’ argument is that the District Court 
created an unworkable and “impossible test” when it held that the DEQ 
must identify the future facility operator if the operator’s identity has the 
potential to impact various secondary issues such as human health and 
safety.48 Intervenors argue that this “test” is not required by MEPA and is 
so broad that in actuality, it is more of a “requirement” that the District 
Court impermissibly created on its own.49 
Intervenors argue that the permit contained all of the required 
information about Lee Foss and speculation about the future operator’s 
identity is unnecessary and unrequired.50 Furthermore, because the 
application revealed the kind of facility it was going to be (grocery-retail 
facility), the DEQ was substantially aware of the impact the facility could 
have when it considered issuing the permit.51 Thus, the DEQ had all of the 
information it required, even though it knew Foss would eventually 
transfer the permit, because the identity of the grocery-retail facility 
operator has no impact on its analysis, so long as the actual application is 
in compliance with the law.52 
Intervenors assert that the District Court’s requirement is 
unnecessary because once Foss goes to transfer the permit, the DEQ will 
learn the identity of the actual operator of the facility and the transfer will 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 8, 11. 
49 Id. at 12. 
50 Reply Brief of Appellant Wanderer at 5, Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-0429%20Appellant%20Reply%20-- 
%20Brief?id={3083FA59-0000-CC1A-AA00-7BBF766863C4}, (Mont. January 31, 2017) (No. DA. 
16-0429). 
51  Id. at 7. 
52 Id. 




be subject to the DEQ’s administrative rules.53 Furthermore, once this 
transfer takes place, the DEQ has the right to incorporate additional 
requirements if it determines that is necessary.54 
Intervenors further argue that this “requirement” would be 
unworkable if the DEQ was forced to do it for every permit because there 
are many instances where the landowner would want to obtain a permit to 
develop their land in preparation for a future sale, without knowing to 
whom they would ultimately sell.55 Thus, this “requirement” created by the 
District Court will have long-lasting, negative repercussions on the ability 
of landowners to transfer their own property.56 
 
C. Appellee Bitterrooters 
 
1. The District Court properly concluded that the construction and 
operation of a grocery-retail facility qualifies as a secondary impact and 
required analysis by the DEQ. 
 
Appellees argue that the DEQ is mistaken as to the breadth of its 
authority.57 Appellees contend that MEPA does not require the DEQ to 
have actual regulatory control over the impacts that it addresses in its EA.58 
Rather, what MEPA requires is that the DEQ gather and reveal this 
information to the public so that the public can weigh in on the DEQ’s 
decision to issue the permit.59 MEPA specifically requires the DEQ to 
consider both direct and secondary impacts prior to its issuance of 
groundwater discharge permits.60 
Appellees state that a secondary impact “means a further impact 
to the human environment that may be stimulated or induced by or 
otherwise result from a direct impact of the action.”61 MEPA requires that 
the state (DEQ in this instance) comply with its terms “to the fullest extent 
possible.”62 Thus, secondary impacts must be broadly defined, and in 
considering “the impact to the human environment,” it is impermissibly 
narrow to fail to consider causally-connected occurrences such as changes 
to traffic flow and impacts on vegetation because these occurrences clearly 




53 Opening Brief of Appellant Wanderer, supra note 2, at 15. 
54  Id. at 16. 
55  Id. at 15. 
56  Id. at 16. 
57 Answer Brief of Appellees, supra note 4, at 24–25. 
58  Id. at 25. 
59  Id. at 27. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. (citing Mont. Admin. R. 17.4.603(18) (2015)). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 




Appellees argue that in this instance the DEQ conducted no 
secondary impact analysis at all.64 Appellees also state that “the 
construction of the largest retail facility in Ravalli County” will clearly 
have an impact on the human environment.65 Thus, the DEQ 
impermissibly narrowed the scope of its authority when it failed to 
consider the secondary impact the proposed grocery-retail facility would 
have on the human environment.66 
Appellees cite to many of the same cases that the DEQ cited (along 
with several other cases)67 regarding whether or not this is a “small handle” 
issue.68 Appellees argue that this is not a “small handle” issue because, 
here, the permit is “for the entire project.”69 Contrary to Appellants’ 
interpretation of “small handle” case law, Appellees argue that in this case 
the DEQ had the responsibility to analyze the environmental consequences 
of the project, even those consequences that are outside of its control.70 
The DEQ is not actually regulating these secondary impacts, and thus this 
is not a “small handle” issue, as the DEQ is merely supposed to gather the 
information and inform the public.71 Accordingly, the DEQ’s issuance of 
this permit does not qualify as a “small handle” issue that is beyond the 
scope of its authority, and some level of secondary analysis should have 
been performed.72 
 
2. The District Court did not err in holding that the DEQ must 
identify the future operator of the permit to the public for its consideration 
prior to its issuance of the permit. 
 
Appellees argue that MEPA requires the DEQ to identify and 
disclose to the public the identity of the future operator of the permit when 
it knows that the current applicant will not be actually operating the 
permit.73 Appellees note that it is extremely unusual for the DEQ to 
approve a permit to someone that is not going to actually use the permit 
and cite to numerous examples where the permit applicant revealed the 
true nature of the business.74 Appellees argue that reversing the District 
Court would amount to silent approval of a “shell game” that allows permit 
applicants to act as front men to intentionally hide the true identity of the 
actual permit operator.75 
 
64  Id. at 25. 
65  Id. at 27. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 27–31; See supra note 38. 
68 Answer Brief of Appellees, supra note 4, at 31. 
69 Id. at 32. 
70 Id. 
71  Id. at 33. 
72  Id. at 34. 
73  Id. at 18. 
74  Id. at 20. 
75  Id. at 18. 




Appellees note that Mont. Admin. R. 17.4.609 (2015) sets out an 
extensive list of the things that the DEQ should consider when performing 
an EA, such as impacts on human health and demands for government 
services.76 When the DEQ drafts its EA, the DEQ must evaluate “not only 
environmental impacts that are certain to occur, but also those that have 
the potential to occur.”77 In this instance, the identity of the future operator 
of the permit has the potential to have an impact on the environment if the 
operator has a history of polluting the environment because it could then 
be predicted that the operator is likely to pollute again.78 This makes the 
identity of the applicant not only relevant but a required part of the DEQ’s 
analysis.79 
Appellees further argue that the DEQ’s actions in this case are also 
plainly in violation of the spirit of MEPA and public policy.80 Secretive 
planning that deprives the public of its ability to fully comment on a permit 
application serves no legitimate public policy.81 
 
D. Appellee Amicus Curiae Montana Environmental Information 
Center 
 
1. The DEQ has violated the constitutional rights of Montanans by issuing 
this permit without determining the true identity of the party that will 
ultimately operate the permit. 
 
Amici argue that the DEQ has impermissibly narrowed its own 
authority and in doing so has violated the constitutional rights of 
Montanans to a clean and healthful environment.82 MEPA requires the 
DEQ to carefully scrutinize the potential environmental consequences of 
its actions.83 The DEQ’s interpretation of secondary impacts 
impermissibly narrows its scope of authority because it does not conform 
with the DEQ’s requirement to take a “hard look” at the impact its actions 
will have on the environment.84 
Amici argues that the DEQ’s interpretation of secondary impacts 
amounts to a “leap before you fully look” mentality that ignores the 
impacts associated with issuing the permit to someone who will not 
 
 
76 Id. at 21–22. 
77 Id. at 22. 
78 Id. at 23–24. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 24. 
81 Id. 
82 Brief of Amicus Curiae at 4, Bitterrooters for Planning, Inc. v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/DA%2016-0429%20Amicus%20-- 
%20Brief?id={E097B259-0000-C32F-BB06-A6DEA998F7C2}, (Mont. January 17, 2017) (No. DA. 
16-0429). 
83  Id. at 3. 
84  Id. at 5. 




actually operate the permit.85 Amici asserts that the District Court should 
be affirmed because the DEQ failed to properly consider the secondary 
impacts associated with the permit and in doing so violated Montanans 




Under the Montana Constitution, Montanans have a right to a 
clean and healthful environment.87 The Montana Legislature incorporated 
this constitutional right into MEPA.88 When a state actor is acting on behalf 
of the state on a matter that falls under the authority of MEPA, the act 
requires that the public be informed of the anticipated impacts of the 
potential state actions.89 Thus, the ultimate purpose of MEPA is to protect 
the State of Montana from environmental destruction and to keep the 
public informed of the state’s actions that are taken in furtherance of this 
goal. 
Montana has been deeply-scarred throughout its history by 
environmental abuse and destruction.90 MEPA was enacted to prevent the 
continuance of this historical environmental destruction.91 The plain 
language contained in MEPA requires that the public be informed of 
potential state actions, such as those taken by the DEQ in this case.92 
MEPA furthermore requires the DEQ to carefully scrutinize the 
potential consequences of its actions in granting permits for groundwater 
discharge.93 This process requires the DEQ to analyze the direct impacts 
of its actions and the secondary impacts of its actions.94 While the parties 
disagree as to the definition of “secondary impacts,” all parties agree that 
MEPA requires the DEQ to take a “hard look” at the environmental 
consequences of its actions.95 Thus, all parties to this action acknowledge 
that under MEPA, the DEQ’s legal obligation is to protect the environment 
and keep the public informed of the anticipated impacts of its actions. 
Appellants have argued that, in issuing a groundwater discharge 
permit, it is unnecessary to determine the identity of the party who will 
ultimately operate the permit and that the unknown entity’s identity does 
not have any potential impact on the environment. Under this theory, the 
DEQ’s only obligation is to look at the snap-shot of time when the permit 
application is submitted and nothing else. This theory leads to the DEQ’s 
 
85 Id. at 5–6. 
86 Id. at 6. 
87 MONT. CONST. ART. II, § 3. 
88 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75–1–102(1). 
89 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75–1–102(1)(b). 
90 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 82, at 1. 
91 Id. 
92 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75–1–102(1)(b). 
93 Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 82, at 3. 
94 Id. 
95 Ravalli Cnty. Fish & Game v. Dep’t of State Lands, 903 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Mont. 1995). 




conclusion that investigating a party’s environmental record is beyond the 
scope of its authority, so long as that party is one step removed from the 
immediate permit application. 
In this case, the DEQ argues that, even though Foss has confirmed 
he will eventually transfer this permit to another unknown party, this fact 
is irrelevant to its analysis because, when the transfer occurs, Appellants 
will then know the identity of the true permit holder. Appellants argue that 
at this point the DEQ can sanction the new permit holder if the new permit 
holder were to violate the law. 
Appellees argue that this analysis ignores the reality that some 
corporations (such as companies that have tract records of violating 
environmental laws) will simply add to their cost of doing business the 
cost of an environmental clean-up years down the road. Appellees argue 
that alleviating existing pollution that a company has caused is not the 
same thing as preventing the pollution from occurring in the first place. It 
is thus relevant whether the party applying for the permit has a history of 
violating environmental laws. A policy that promotes the DEQ’s ability to 
sanction a company only after the company has polluted Montana is far 
less protective of Montana’s environment than a policy that would 
promote the DEQ acting with due diligence prior to the issuance of the 
permit. 
Furthermore, Appellants seem to downplay their obligation under 
MEPA to keep the public informed of its actions. If Appellants argument 
is upheld, it would effectively subvert democracy because this later portion 
of the permitting process would not involve the public,96 and thus the use 
of Foss would effectively prevent the public from commenting on any 
matter related to the actual entity moving into Ravalli County. 
Appellees have argued that it is required by MEPA that the public 
be given all of the necessary information prior to the issuance of a 
groundwater discharge permit, including the identity of the party and its 
environmental record. If Appellees’ argument is upheld, the DEQ’s 
authority will be clarified as broad, and it will be granted the authority to 
more fully consider the impacts of its actions. 
On the one hand, allowing the DEQ this broad authority to 
investigate permit applicants would likely result in potential polluters 
shying away from Montana’s strict scrutiny of their environmental record. 
This policy would comply with both Montanans right to a clean and 
healthful environment and with the overarching purpose of MEPA.97 
 
 
96 See MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.30.1360 (2015). Although under Mont. Admin. R. 17.30.1361(1) certain 
circumstances may trigger a complete re-application, where the public could then re-weigh in on the 
permit, it is highly unlikely that this will occur. Unless the new entity drastically alters the site plans, 
prior to the time of transfer, there would be no legal obligation on the DEQ to conduct a re-application 
process, and the public will have no say in re-analyzing the permit after the entity’s identity is revealed. 
See MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.30.1361. 
97 MONT. CONST. ART. II, § 3; MONT. CODE ANN. § 75–1–102(1) (2015). 




On the other hand, Appellants’ argument is not without merit. 
Giving the DEQ this vast authority may at times make the process 
cumbersome and difficult to comply with, as Intervenors have asserted. 
Although it may not be the case here, there are certainly times when the 
applicant will need to be a different person than the ultimate user of the 
permit, not because of its desire to shroud its identity but for marketability 
purposes. There will likely be times when an individual landowner will 
want to obtain a permit in anticipation of a sale, and the District Court’s 
holding could unduly complicate matters for the landowner, even when 
the landowner’s intentions are completely benign. In these circumstances, 
the District Court’s holding may in fact prove to be overly broad, making 
the process unduly burdensome and unworkable. 
The Court’s decision in this case will have a lasting impact on the 
authority of the DEQ to fully investigate the circumstances of a permit 
application. If the Court upholds the decision of the district court, it will 
send the message that the DEQ’s authority is broad and that Montana does 
not approve of parties hiding behind front men to deprive Montanans of 
their constitutional right to fully weigh in on the decision to ultimately 
grant a party a permit. If the Court rejects the decision of the district court, 
it will send the message that the DEQ’s authority is limited to investigating 
the current circumstances surrounding a permit and that determining the 
identity of the future operator of a permit is beyond the scope of the DEQ’s 
authority, regardless of the future operators’ intentions. 
